Use of Wasabi

Wallet Manager

How do I generate a new wallet?

You can generate as many new wallets as you'd like, for no extra cost and without asking for permission. Go to the Wallet Manager tab and the Generate Wallet menu. As with everything in Wasabi, you are required to label this new wallet. Make sure that you are precise so that you know what this is for later. The password is used to encrypt the private key on the computer and on the backup. Careful!! Without knowledge of the password, you CANNOT spend your bitcoin!! Make sure that you properly back up and write down this password. Please also read and agree to the terms and conditions, the privacy policy and the legal issues. Now you can continue with clicking Generate.

Now you will see the 12 recovery words, this is the mnemonic seed that you can use to backup and recover your wallet. Make sure, and triple check, that you have done a proper backup of BOTH the password AND the mnemonic. When you only have the recovery words, but not the password, then you will NOT be able to recover your wallet. In order to protect your paper backup, consider storing the password and recovery words in two different locations. You have successfully setup your wallet when you click I wrote down my Recovery Words!

What password should I use?

The password you set is used to encrypt the mnemonic recovery words, and the private keys stored on the computer. This is the password that will unlock your bitcoin to anyone who has access to the backup or computer. You will need to type in the password before you can spend from Wasabi wallet. So if your backup gets compromised, this password is the only thing protecting your precious sats.

It is VERY important to use a random and long password.

Since it is very difficult for humans to generate true randomness, it is good to use a tool to help find a strong password. This can be the dice ware wordlist, for true off-line password. A secure password manager software might also be used, but be careful here.

How do I back up my mnemonic words?

Always backup your encrypted private keys!

Wasabi uses BIP 39: mnemonic code for generating deterministic keys to enable easy backups of all private keys in the wallet. The mnemonic is displayed as 12 recovery words that are only shown once during the wallet generation.

But these words are encrypted with BIP 38: password-protected private key, so that the computer stores the private key in cyphertext and not cleartext.

In order to restore a wallet from backup, you need BOTH the mnemonic words AND the password!

It is a good idea to keep the two in separate analog backups, such as a laminated paper written with pencil. In order to defend against nature destroying fragile paper, you can consider stamping the words into metal. Use two different backups and locations for the mnemonic and password, because whoever has both [including a physical attacker] has full access to your sats. Find a secure physical location to store the backups, maybe a home safe, or an expert security deposit box.

Please see this great guide on how to properly store your seed.

How do I backup my wallet file?

Although you can backup your private keys with the mnemonic words and password, this is only a last resort recovery. If you want to also secure your address labels, the anonset and additional metadata, then you can do a digital backup. Simply copy the .walletwasabi/client/WalletBackups folder with the wallet.json files onto suitable hardware, for example an encrypted USB stick. Note that this file has the encrypted private keys, meaning that you only need the password to spend the bitcoin. This also contains the unencrypted extended public keys and address labels, meaning that it completely links all the coins, both pre and post mix, with clear proof.

The wallet backup is sensitive, in terms of privacy, but not critical in terms of loss of funds. So it is good advice to encrypt this wallet file.

Can I spend my bitcoin without the password?

NO!!! Without knowledge of your password, even when you have the wallet file and recovery words, you can NOT spend your bitcoin!

When creating a new wallet, after labeling it properly, the next step is to select a long and random password. This is used to encrypt the private key on your computer, which has an insecure operating system and is connected to the internet. Every time you want to spend your coins from Wasabi, you MUST provide this password. Also, the same password is used to encrypt the mnemonic recovery words that you must backup in the next step of wallet creation. So even if you have these words securely engraved in metal, without the password, you cannot restore the backup of your wallet.

Always backup your encrypted mnemonic recovery words, and your password in two separate secure locations.

Why BIP 38?

BIP 38 is a good standard, a well-tested and very secure way to encrypt a private key. It is also implemented in the NBitcoin library so, it's easy to use. Additionally, there is no standard way (bip) to encrypt HD wallets. Take into account that it is not only encryption what bip38 provides but also a brute-force protection.


What are BIP-158 block filters?

When you do not run a full node, you need to communicate with some third party node to find out how much money you have. There are very bad wallets that simply send the extended public key, and thus all your addresses and your entire transaction history, to a selected, or random server. This means that this trusted third party has full knowledge of a lot your sensitive financial data.

This is not acceptable

Do not send your extended public key to a third party server!

This is why Wasabi uses BIP-158 block filters to ensure network level privacy. It's as good as running a full node.

The Wasabi coordinator will send your wallet comparatively small block filters, and you check locally if the block contains a transaction with your coins. If not, then the filter is stored for later reference and for syncing new wallets. If yes, then the wallet connects to a random Bitcoin peer-to-peer full node to request this entire block. Your wallet does not communicate with the Wasabi server to download the block, because there's no need to trust it. For every block download, Wasabi establishes a new and unique tor identity, meaning that it is not easy to link that it is the same entity downloading all these blocks. The P2P node that serves you the block does not know if you are a regular Bitcoin full node, or a Wasabi light client node. You are yet another peer in the network.

It is important to note that although the privacy is as good as with a full node, you do not verify that the coins are actually valid. In order to do this, you must run a full node and verify the entire timechain. With the block filters, you trust that the Wasabi server gives you the correct filters, and does not withhold any of them. You also do not have proof that the block you download from a P2P node is actually in the valid chain, but you can verify the proof of work in the block header.

How does Wasabi download a relevant block?

Wasabi uses BIP 158 block filter to find out if a specific block contains a transaction of a specific wallet. If so, then by default Wasabi connects to a random Bitcoin peer to peer full node over tor, and requests only to download this block. For each block, it generates a new and separate tor identity.

If you are running your own node, then you can pull this block directly from the timechain that you have fully verified your self. If the node is on the same computer, then it is connected automatically by default. You can also specify the local IP or tor hidden service of your remote full node.

How do I know if the synchronization is finished?

You know that tor is properly connected, that all the block filters and all the relevant blocks are downloaded when you see that the status bar is Ready.

What does it mean "Missing Filters"?

The Missing Filters label indicates that Wasabi is still downloading the BIP158 block filters and it's synchronizing your wallet. You have just to wait until the status bar is Ready.

How long does the initial, and a subsequent synchronization take?

It usually only takes a couple seconds to scan the block filters, download and parse the blocks. However, for large wallets with a many transactions, this synchronization can take up to several minutes. We are constantly improving the speed and reliability of the loading process. For especially old wallets, it might be worth considering to start a new wallet with a shorter transaction history.


Why is it bad to re-use addresses?

Bitcoin is designed so that for every payment you can use a new address that is not tied to any of your previous addresses. When you use a new address for every coin, then it becomes much much more difficult to find out that these coins are from you. However, when you use the same address for every coin, then everyone knows that they all can be spend by one individual who has knowledge of the private key - you! Thus, when someone finds out that you have that address, maybe you published it in your social media profile for donations, or you send a coin to another peer who knows you, then they know also how many bitcoin you have in the other coins with that same address. Take good care to whom you tell your addresses, and every time, tell someone a different address.

Because you have all the private keys, for all these addresses, you can produce a valid signature for any of them. So you can prove that these are your bitcoin, without relying on reputation that you have any other coins. You can easily generate and store many billions of private keys and addresses in a convenient BIP 44 multi-account hierarchy for deterministic wallets so that you can backup everything in your 12 word mnemonic phrase.

This is what is used in Wasabi. You have on mnemonic backup, and unlimited numbers of new addresses. Everytime a coin is received, the address is removed from the GUI so that you are not tempted to use it again.


How do I generate a new receiving address?

You can generate a new bech32 address in the Receive tab of Wasabi Wallet. First you must set a label for it, so that you later know who has sent you bitcoin to this address. Be precise in the reason for the payment, labeling is an important part of good coin control privacy best practices. Then you can click on Generate which will now show you the address, and immediately copy it to the clipboard. After a coin has been sent to this address, it is removed from the GUI, this is a good feature to help protect you against address reuse.

Why do I have to label my address?

Bitcoin addresses look like cyphertext, they are not easily remembered and it's not clear how they were used previously. Thus when you do not label all your transactions, then there is no meta-data for you to understand the context of that coin. When you clearly label a receiving address, then later when spending this coin, you know where it came from. This helps you to judge weather there are privacy concerns when sending a specific coin to some specific receiver.

How can I change the label of my address?

You can change the label of your receive address in the right click menu by clicking Change Label, then type in the new label. This is useful for when you have generated a receiving address with a specific label, but then the cause for receiving is no longer present. Take care with whom you have shared this address, because if you send it to several people, they might all send many coins to the same address. This is very bad for your privacy because of address reuse, and it confuses you with the labeling of each unique coin.

Are there privacy concerns regarding whom I send my address?

Yes. Whomever you send your address, he knows that this address, and any coin sent to it, belongs to you. Thus it is important to have labeled receiving addresses, so that you know which address is for what purpose. It is important that you avoid sending the same address to several different individuals. There is a risk that both of them send coins to this same destination, thus unnecessarily linking the payments.

It is especially important to NEVER send your extended public key to any third party server. This is a complete de-anonymization of your entire wallet!!

Why does Wasabi only use SegWit bech32 addresses?

Wasabi generates Bech32 addresses only, also known as bc1 addresses or native SegWit addresses. These addresses start with the characters bc1... Some wallets/exchanges do not yet support this type of address and may give an error message (e.g. "unknown bitcoin address"). The solution is to manage your funds with a wallet which does support Bech32. To check Bech32 adoption and exchange/wallet support you can follow Wiki and When Segwit? website.

Be careful, if you send all your coins from an old wallet to a new wallet (from the table above) in one transaction then you will merge all your coins which is bad for privacy - instead, send the coins individually or if possible import the seed in the new wallet.

Where can I find my address QR code and public key?

You can see the address QR code, public key and the key path in the drop down menu of the Receive tab. Click on the arrow on the left side of the address to reveal the extra details.

What derivation paths does Wasabi use?

Wasabi follows [BIP 84: Derivation scheme for P2WPKH Based Accounts](IP 84: Derivation scheme for P2WPKH Based Accounts), so the main path is m/84'/0'/0'. On TestNet and RegTest Wasabi uses m/84'/0'/0', and not the standard m/84'/1'/0'. Due to the CoinJoin implementation, the key depth can be rather large, thus when recovering the gap limit should be elevated to at least 100.

Can I generate a multi signature script?


Multi signature scripts define that there need to be m-of-n signatures provided in order to spend this UTXO. For example in a 2-of-3, Alice alone cannot spend the sats, she needs the collaboration of either Bob or Charlie. In the current way of implementation, a legacy and SegWit v0 multisig address is clearly disdinguishable, there are three public keys and two signatures, and not one single public key and signature. This means that your anonymity set, the crowd you hide in, gets a lot smaller. If some one knows that you use a multisig, then they can narrow down their search for your coins. Thus, multisignatures decrease your privacy, and Wasabi is not implementing tools that degrade your privacy.

Yet multisig is a popular feature, and many Wasabikas do request it for extra security, willing to trade-off some privacy. Electrum Wallet is a fantastic wallet with many features, but only private if you connect to your own Electrum server full node. Electrum can be used to create different types of m-of-n multisig scripts, including with your hardware wallet.

Anyway, since Wasabi is using the Hardware Wallet Interface with partially signed Bitcoin transactions, the implementation might come in #twoweeks, check the ToDo list. Schnorr key and signature aggregation with MuSig increases the privacy, since only one public key, not n, are committed on the timechain. So when Schnorr is activated in the Bitcoin consensus, in #twoweeks, there are no privacy concerns standing in the way of Wasabi multisig!


What are coins?

Bitcoin uses a system of inputs and outputs to keep track who owns how many sats. Every transaction specifies one or more inputs, the chunk of bitcoin being spent, and one or more outputs, the destination of who receives the bitcoin. A coin is also called an unspent transaction output UTXO, meaning that this output has not been used as the input of a new transaction - it is yet to be spent. In order to spend a UTXO, the valid signature and script has to be provided in the transaction. This ensures that only with knowledge of the correct private key can this coin be sent to a new address. This chain of links between inputs being spent and outputs being generated is verified by every full node, and stored on the timechain.

Why is coin control so important?

Satoshis, the base currency in the Bitcoin network, are fungible units of account. It's just a number that shows how much value is being transferred, and the number 100 is "the same" any time the number 100 is used. The 9000 sats you spend on stickers are equal to the 9000 sats you spend on coffee. Just like 1 gram of gold atoms are equal to any other 1 gram of gold atoms.

However, the unspent transaction outputs, the coins that hold the satoshi, they are not fungible. Every UTXO is a unique snowflake that has it's own transaction history, as well as an independent spending condition. The coin worth 2 bitcoin and locked by Alice's public key is not the same as the UTXO worth 5 bitcoin locked by the 2-of-3 multi signature of Bob, Charlie and David. So when sending bitcoin, it's important to consider which actual outputs are being sent in the transaction.

It might be a problem when Alice sends the coin she received for a months worth of labor, in exchange for a coffee in Bob's store. Now Bob knows the amount Alice gets paid, and this is none of his business. Alice can protect herself against this by using a CoinJoin UTXO, because now Bob can not know the previous transactions from Alice.

How do I set a destination address?

In the Send tab, there is a text box for the Address right under the coin list. If you have an address in the clipboard, then it is automatically pasted when you click on the box. You can also type in the bech32 address manually, there is a checksum to make help you find typos. Be careful and double check the address, there is no way to revert this transaction and change the destination. So make sure that the coins get into the right hands.

Can I pay to many addresses?

Unfortunately pay to many is not not yet implemented. But this is on the ToDo list! Coming in #twoweeks.

How do I set the payment amount?

After you select one or more coins as inputs in send tab, say two anonset coins worth 0.1 bitcoin each. You can manually set the exact amount that the destination address will receive in the output of the transaction, say 0.15 bitcoin. Then Wasabi will help you with automatically calculating the precise change output value with inputs - destination output - confirmation fee.

How can I use the MAX button?

When you select one or more coins as inputs in send tab, say two anonset coins worth each 0.1 bitcoin. You can click the MAX button and the transaction will have only one output with the destination address, and no change output. Wasabi will calculate the precise value for the destination output with inputs - confirmation fee. This means you send the entire two coins to the receiving address, and there is no change coming back to your own wallet, you are sending a "whole coin".

The timechain spy heuristic is that this is a transaction to yourself, for example to your hardware wallet for long-term hodling. Most of the time this assumption is correct - the amount of an external payment is rarely exactly the same as the value of the sum of coins in the input, thus requiring change. It does not matter what value the coin has when you send it to yourself, thus there is no change. But you can use this assumption to your advantage by sending the MAX amount to your external destination, for example for pizza at the tribe gathering. If the change would be only a small amount, maybe you accept the overpayment as price for your privacy. If the input is not high enough value for the payment, maybe the receiver accepts a slight underpayment. You can also use payment rails like Lightning Network to send the small value change privately off-chain.

When using the MAX button, it looks like you send back to yourself. This can be used to spy on you! But you can also use it to your advantage when paying others.

Why does Wasabi choose a new random node every time I send a transaction?

When you broadcast a transaction from a full node, that transaction is flooded onto the network. Essentially, all nearby nodes are passed your transaction, and those nodes will pass to all of their nearby nodes, etc. However, if a malicious adversary were to get enough relay nodes in the network, they could pretty easily connect the initial location of a transaction by simply observing from which node the transaction appeared first. For this reason, broadcasting transaction through your own node may reveal your IP address.

So to fix this Wasabi broadcasts your transactions to a random node, and messages that node through TOR, so the node cannot detect your IP address. When you want to subsequently send another transaction on the network, Wasabi destroys the original TOR bridge and connection to the node and establishes a new TOR bridge and connection with a brand new node. This reduces the risk of a passive bystander being able to link two transactions together that appear from the same location.

What fee should I select?

Wasabi uses the [smartfee]( estimation algorithm provided by bitcoind. This integrates both data from recent blocks, as well as the local mempool to estimate the current and future demand for blockspace. The lower the fee is, the longer the estimated wait; and the higher the fee, the faster the confirmation will come. There are several different confidence levels, each of them gives an educated guess how soon the transaction will confirm. But the provided time frames are only a rough estimation, and not at all a precise metric.

Because confirmation fee estimation is more an art than a science, you can also set the fee manually. Then you can go after your gut feeling, mempool chart analysis, or just putting the minimum of 1 sat/vByte.

For a transaction to yourself, for example from your hot CoinJoin wallet to your hardware wallet, you don't need to have fast confirmation, so you can set a low fee. But to send from the hot CoinJoin wallet to the coffee shop, you might want to get faster confirmation, thus paying a higher fee. This really depends on your own time preference in every unique moment.


These sats are precious, so don't overpay on fees!

How can I display the fee in satoshis per byte?

The fee you pay to get confirmation on the Bitcoin timechain is denominated in satoshis per virtual byte. This means that the larger your transaction size, meaning the number of inputs and outputs, then the more total bitcoin you have to pay for confirmation. If you want faster confirmation, then you have to pay proportionally more sats per vByte.

You can toggle the display of the fee between sat/vByte & percentage of transfered value & total bitcoin & total USD by clicking on the text of the fee.


Why aren't there smaller equal denomination outputs like 0.05 BTC?

There are many reasons for that. The most prominent one may be DoS attack issues. In fact ZeroLink's DoS protection have been designed with 1BTC in mind, not with 0.1BTC, so we may even have to elevate it if someone with sufficient resources would decide to go for DoS attacking Wasabi.

Everything in Bitcoin (and life) is about trade offs. When we build CoinJoin transactions on the Bitcoin Blockchain, remember that we always have to pay the miner fees. Miner fees are not dependent on the value of Bitcoin being transferred, rather, only on the size of the transaction in (v)bytes. So that means constructing a CoinJoin with 0.1 BTC outputs, with 100 participants, and constructing a CoinJoin with 0.01 BTC Outputs with 100 participants will cost the same in terms of miner fees.

So let's dig into the numbers a bit further. What does it cost (from the miner perspective) to participate in a CoinJoin? Well most users will provide 1 input, and 2 outputs (change + mixed UTXO) and we can calculate the vbytes like so:

1 * (68 vbytes) + 2 * (33 vbytes) = 134 vbytes

But it is important to note that many users provide 2 inputs (UTXOs) or even sometimes 3 or 4, so we should really put a multiplier of 1.5x on the inputs:

1.5 * (68 vbytes) + 2 * (33 vbytes) = 168 vbytes

Excellent, this is the Cost-per-participant of an equal-output CoinJoin. Now let's consider the variable miner fees in sat/vbyte that we might pay to get the CoinJoin mined within a reasonable time (<24 hours):

Minimum: 2 sat/vbyte: 336 satoshis per participant Average: 10 sat/vbyte: 1,680 satoshis per participant High: 100 sat/vbyte: 16,800 satoshis per participant

So now let's examine how much (as a percentage) users have to pay for different denominations of equal output coinjoins. We will take the example of 1 BTC, 0.1 BTC (current setting) and 0.01 BTC (proposed): First 1 BTC:

Minimum: 2 sat/vbyte: 336 satoshis per participant (0.000336 %) Average: 10 sat/vbyte: 1,680 satoshis per participant (0.00168 %) High: 100 sat/vbyte: 16,800 satoshis per participant (0.0168 %)

Notice that for such a large amount, the miner, even in extreme cases only takes <0.02% (note this is not 2%!). Let's observer for 0.1 BTC:

Minimum: 2 sat/vbyte: 336 satoshis per participant (0.00336 %) Average: 10 sat/vbyte: 1,680 satoshis per participant (0.0168 %) High: 100 sat/vbyte: 16,800 satoshis per participant (0.168 %)

Here, we already observe that in some extreme cases, the miner is earning almost 0.2%! Recall that Wasabi has a coordinator fee that is capped at 0.3%, so in these extreme cases the actual fee paid by the user (you) is not 0.3% as promised, but closer to 0.5%. Now we proceed to go to a smaller denominaton, 0.01 BTC:

Minimum: 2 sat/vbyte: 336 satoshis per participant (0.0336 %) Average: 10 sat/vbyte: 1,680 satoshis per participant (0.168 %) High: 100 sat/vbyte: 16,800 satoshis per participant (1.68 %)

Notice that in the average case, users are regularly paying almost 0.5% for CoinJoining, and only 60% of this is going to the Wasabi Coordinator. In the extreme case, which simply cannot be overlooked as the network is volatile in terms of daily usage, the miner is earning 5.5x what Wasabi coordinator is charging, and the users are burdened with a 2% fee for CJ! This is simply ridiculous! So there you have it! Here is the trade-off with CJ output denominations and why it currently makes sense for 0.1 BTC, but not for much lower. :::

What are the fees for the CoinJoin?

You currently pay a fee of 0.003% * anonymity set. If the anonymity set of a coin is 50 then you pay 0.003% * 50 (=0.15%). If you set the target anonymity set to 53 then Wasabi will continue mixing until this is reached, so you may end up with an anonymity set of say 60, and you will pay 0.003% * 60 (=0.18%).

There are also edge cases where you do not pay the full fee or where you pay more. For example if you're the smallest registrant to a round, you will never pay a fee. Also when you are remixing and you cannot pay the full fee with your input, then you only pay as much as you have, but if the change amount leftover would be too small, then that is also added to the fee. Currently the minimum change amount to be paid out is 0.7% of the base denomination (~0.1BTC.)

It is also possible that you get more back from mixing than you put in. This happens when network fees go down between the start of the round and its end. In this case, the difference is split between the active outputs of the mix.

What is the anonymity set?

The anonymity set is effectively the size of the group you are hiding in.

If 3 people take part in a CoinJoin (with equal size inputs) and there are 3 outputs then each of those output coins has an anonymity set of 3.

0.1 BTC (Alice)       0.1 BTC (Anon set 3)
0.3 BTC (Bob)     ->  0.1 BTC (Anon set 3)
0.4 BTC (Charlie)     0.1 BTC (Anon set 3)
                      0.2 BTC (Change Coin Bob)
                      0.3 BTC (Change Coin Charlie)

There is no way to know which of the anon set output coins are owned by which of the input owners.

All an observer knows is that a specific anon set output coin is owned by one of the owners of one of the input Coins i.e. 3 people - hence an anonymity set of 3.

Your Wasabi software has limited information on what the anonymity set should be, so the anonymity set that the software presents you is just an estimation, not an accurate value. With Wasabi we are trying to do lower estimations, rather than higher ones.

What are the denominations created in one round?

In every CoinJoin round the minimum to register is roughly 0.1 BTC, you need to have at least this much to participate. Within the same transaction, Wasabi also efficiently generates larger value zero link CoinJoin denominations. They are 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 3.2, and so on... The possible values of equal output that can be created are 0.1 x 2^n where n is a positive integer. This is the mathematically most efficient way to get anonymity set for any amount you desire. For example, with a 0.7 BTC input you would expect the following outputs: ~0.1, ~0.2, ~0.4 BTC.

Why are the denominations such an odd number?

The output value changes each round to ensure that you can enqueue a coin and have it remix (mix over and over again - increasing the anonymity set, improving privacy). As a result the round mixing amount will often be a specific number which generally decreases as the rounds proceed, with a reset once a lower bound is reached.

What is happening in the input registration phase?

During the input registration, you select which coins you want to register for CoinJoin. These coins need to be confirmed on the Bitcoin timechain, unless they are from a Wasabi CoinJoin and you re-register them. In the background, Wasabi generates an input proof so that the coordinator can verify that you actually own this coin. Then Wasabi generates several addresses, depending on the value of inputs registered. The address of the anonset CoinJoin output must not be linked to your input, and thus it is cryptographically blinded to incomprehensible cypher-text. Since the change output can be easily linked to your input with CoinJoin sudoku [reference missing], this address is not blinded, but sent in clear-text.

Wasabi wallet generates a new tor identity [reference missing] called Alice, she is like a separate entity, and for every round you use a new Alice who is not linked to any previous connection. With Alice, you send some information to the Wasabi coordinator server: [i] the input coin that you want to register, together with the input proof signature; [ii] the clear text change address; and [iii] the blinded anonset CoinJoin output.

The Wasabi coordinator now verifies that: [i] there is still room for more peers on this CoinJoin; [ii] the blinded output has never been registered before; [iii] each input has not been registered before, is not banned, is unspent, and that the input proof is valid; and [iv] that the sum value of inputs is higher than the minimum required value of 0.1 bitcoin. Only when all these checks are valid does the coordinator sign the blinded output. He does not know the address that he is signing, because it is blinded. This signature is proof that the coordinator has verified that Alice is not cheating. The coordinator sends the signed blinded output back to Alice.

Alice has the private key to unblind the signed blinded output. With the magic of cryptography, she can reveal the clear-text address of the anonset CoinJoin output, however, the coordinator signature is still attached to this address.

The input registration phase ends when either, the number of registered inputs exceeds the number of required inputs [meaning anonymity set of 100 peers]; or when the last round was two hours ago.

[missing: explanation of uniqueld]

What is happening in the connection confirmation phase?

There are many Alice's registering their inputs in the first phase, and the connection confirmation phase makes sure that all of them are still online. The coordinator verifies the unique ID from all the Alice's, and when everyone is still communicating, then the coordinator returns the round hash of all the registered inputs. The round is abandoned and re-started if too many Alice's have dropped, for example when Wasabi is shut down, or when the tor connection is temporarily broken.

The connection confirmation phase ends when all Alice's have provided their inputs, or after a timeout when the online Alice's are still larger than the required number of peers.

[missing: explanation of uniqueld]

What is happening in the output registration phase?

Now that all peers are online, we are ready to proceed with the output registration phase of the round. Wasabi generates a completely new tor identity Bob, he is in no way tied to Alice. Bob sends to the Wasabi coordinator: [i] the clear-text address for the anonset CoinJoin output; [ii] the coordinator signature over that output; and [iii] the round hash of all the inputs. Because the coordinator can verify his own signature, he knows that this output was initially sent by any Alice [he cannot know which Alice exactly] and that he has verified that everything is in order.

It is very important that the coordinator cannot link Alice to Bob. Because Alice has sent the clear-text input, and Bob sends the clear-text output. So, if the two were to be linked, then the coordinator can specifically link the input to the output, meaning that the anonymity set is 1. Because Alice commits to the output by sending it blinded, and because Bob is a new tor identity not linked to Alice, the coordinator can verify that nobody is cheating, but he cannot deanonymize the peers.

The output registration phase ends when the value of clear-text outputs plus change outputs is equal to the the value of inputs. If after a timeout not all outputs are registered, then this round is abandoned, the missing peers are banned, and a new round is started.

What is happening in the signing phase?

Now that all inputs and outputs are registered, the Wasabi coordinator can start the signing phase by building the CoinJoin transaction with all the registered inputs, the anonset outputs, and the change outputs. He sends this transaction to all the Alice's of this round. Each Alice verifies that: [i] the committed round hash is equal to the hash of all the inputs in the proposed transaction; and [ii] her inputs and outputs are correctly included. Then she signs the transaction with the private keys of her inputs. Alice sends the uniqueID, the signature and the input index to the coordinator, who then verifies this information.

The signing phase ends when the coordinator has all the valid signatures for all the registered inputs.

What is happening in the broadcasting phase?

The CoinJoin transaction is successfully built and signed, and it is now ready to be broadcasted to the peers of the Bitcoin network. The coordinator sends this transaction over the tor network to a random full node, and from there it is gossiped to other nodes and miners. Wasabi is saving on mining fees by setting a confirmation target of roughly 12 hours, but you can re-register unconfirmed anonset outputs for the next round of CoinJoin.

Is there any additional anonymity using multiple wallets for CoinJoins?

You'd gain 1 less anonymity set than if you'd only mix with one wallet (and Wasabi doesn't display that). On the other hand, the systemic anonymity is slightly improved if a few people are mixing with multiple wallets, because that removes the certainly on this Blockchain analysis assumption.

How is the anonymity set target determined for CoinJoins?

2*2 = 4 and 3*3 = 9. 2->3: 50% increase, 4->9:125% increase. So remixing with larger anonsets is exponentially more effective than smaller anonsets. Regarding why do we want 100 number, is among some other reasons, because that was our calculation to be that would make rounds happen in every 2-5 minutes, considering the liquidity of some custodial mixers. Regarding DoS attack, right now our DoS configuration is set to be pretty permissive and this seems to be sufficient for the time being. If a DoS attack would to happen, Wasabi team would just harden it in the config file and would kick the bad actors out. Now if even that'd fail, then we can start thinking about lowering the required peers and also other methods.

I'd like to experience CoinJoin but I'm not comfortable using real Bitcoin. What can I do?

You can try to make a CoinJoin via Wasabi on the Bitcoin TestNet (an alternative Bitcoin blockchain, to be used for testing). Go to settings and change the network to TestNet. You can get tBTC from faucets like: or

Hardware Wallet

What hardware wallets does Wasabi support?

The answer is simple:

All of them!

This is thanks to awesome Hardware Wallet Interface of Bitcoin core.

However, not all of the many hardware wallets have been tested and reviewed by the developers. Everything seems to work fine with the ColdCard, Trezor, Ledger and KeepKey.

Why does Wasabi use the Hardware Wallet Interface?

Wasabi uses the Bitcoin Core Hardware Wallet Interface [HWI], a python library tool for proper integration of off-line signing devices. It provides a standard way for any software wallet to communicate with any hardware wallet without needing any device specific drivers. HWI was developed and carefully reviewed over several years, with outstanding contributions by especially Andrew Chow. Wasabi implements C# code that executes the HWI tool. Wasabi uses this powerful tool because there are no other dependencies necessary to support all the existing and future hardware wallets.

How can I generate a Wasabi skeleton wallet file in ColdCard?

On the ColdCard (Mk2, firmware 2.1.1 and up) you go to >Advanced>MicrcoSD Card>Wasabi Wallet and it will save a skeleton json-file to the MicroSD card in the hardware wallet.

How can I import the Wasabi skeleton wallet file?

Take the MicroSD card from the ColdCard and plug it in the computer with the Wasabi Wallet software. In Wasabi Wallet go to the Wallet Manager, select Hardware Wallet option and in the bottom right corner click Import Coldcard. Now select the Wasabi skeleton json-file from the MicroSD card, if this fails you can manually enter the file location in Wasabi Wallet window and load the file.

How can I generate a receiving address of my hardware wallet?

In Wasabi Wallet you load your previously imported wallet (from Wasabi skeleton, or USB detection) and go to the Receive tab, here you enter a label for the incoming transaction and click Generate Receive Address. In the tab below the newly generated receive address can be viewd/copied.

How can I sign a transaction with a USB connected hardware wallet?

To send a transaction you will need to connect your Hardware wallet and unlock the device (using PIN or password), in Wasabi Wallet you go to the Send tab where you can specify the address to send to, amount of bitcoin to send and which coins to use as input (only use green/private coins here!). After filling in all transaction details you click Send Transaction to sign it with the connected hardware wallet and broadcast on the network.

How can I build and export a transaction to ColdCard?

In the Wallet Explorer on the right side of the GUI, select YourWallet>Advanced>Build Transaction. This brings up the Build Transaction tab where you can specify the address, amount of bitcoin and coins to use. Then by clicking Build Transaction a new tab will open containing the raw transaction data, here you click Export Binary PSBT to save the partially signed bitcoin transaction (PSBT) to a file. This file should be moved to the MicroSD card that you can then insert in the ColdCard for manual verification and signing.

How can I sign a transaction on the ColdCard?

On the ColdCard (Mk2, firmware 2.1.1 and up) you enter the PIN code to unlock the hardware wallet and press >Ready To Sign with the MicroSD card containing the previously generated transaction or PSBT-file. Verify the address and amount and the ColdCard will then create a signed.psbt and final.txn file on the MicroSD card. The finalized transaction (xxx-final.txn) can now be broadcasted by Wasabi Wallet or even a radio or satelite dish if someone is listening!

How can I import and broadcast a final transaction from ColdCard?

In the Wallet Explorer you go to YourWallet>Advanced>Broadcast Transaction and click Import Transaction, now you can select the previously finalized (and signed) transaction file from the MicroSD card. If this fails you can manually type the path to this file in Wasabi Wallet to load the transaction. Now click Broadcast Transaction to send it off over Tor to a random Bitcoin node so it can flood over to the miners for confirmation in a block.

Can I CoinJoin the bitcoin on my hardware wallet?

You can't do that directly, so send them (in small portions >0.1BTC if needed) to a ''hot'' Wasabi Wallet for CoinJoin and then send them back to a new address on the Hardware wallet for cold-storage.


How can I check the transactions history?

In the History tab you see a list of all the transactions made with this Wasabi wallet. It includes the value being sent out of the wallet, meaning the payment to an external address and the fee. If the number is red, then you have sent sats out of the wallet - if the number is green, then you have received and stacked sats. A coin join is a payment within the same wallet, thus it only shows the coordination and mining fee leaving the wallet. You also have a list of all the transaction identification numbers for detailed reference. The check mark indicates that the transaction is confirmed in the longest proof-of-work timechain.

Can I export a list of transactions?

There is currently no convenient way to export a list with transaction details. However, you can see the wallet.json files in the .walletwasabi/client/WalletBackups/ folder which contains all the public keys, labels and anonset.


How do I connect my own full node to Wasabi?

There is currently a basic implementation of connecting your full node to Wasabi. The server will still send you BIP 158 block filters, and when you realize that a block contains a transaction of yours, then you pull this block from your own full node, instead of a random P2P node, thus you can verify that this is actually a valid block including your transaction. One attack vector could be that Wasabi lies to you and gives you wrong filters that exclude your transaction, thus you would see in the wallet less coins than you actually control. BIP 157 solves this.

When your full node is on the same hardware [computer, laptop] as your Wasabi Wallet, it will automatically recognize it and pull blocks from there. If your node is on a remote device [raspberry pi, nodl, server], then you can specify your local IP in the Settings tab, or in line 11 of the config file.

How can I turn off Tor?

You can turn off Tor in the Settings. Note that in this case you are still private, except when you CoinJoin and when you broadcast a transaction. In the first case, the coordinator would know the links between your inputs and outputs based on your IP address. In the second case, if you happen to broadcast a transaction of yours to a full node that is spying on you, it will know the link between your transaction and your IP address.

How can I change the anonset target?

In the Settings tab at the bottom you can change the three PrivacyLevelX values of the desired anon set of the yellow, green, and checkmark shield button in the GUI. The MixUntilAnonymitySet is the last selected value from previous use.

Alternatively, open the config file from the wallet GUI, go to File>Open>Config File and in the last 4 lines you see:

"MixUntilAnonymitySet": 50,
"PrivacyLevelSome": 2,
"PrivacyLevelFine": 21,
"PrivacyLevelStrong": 50

Remember that you pay a fee proportional to the Anonymity Set.

What is the dust threshold?

Dust can mean a lot of things, depending how you look at it. It can be non economical inputs, that is a UTXO that has less value than the fees it would cost to spend this coin. A dust attack is actually about forced address reuse, the malicious actor sends very small amounts into old addresses and consolidation of these dust UTXOs can link several coins in a wallet cluster.

Specifically in the context of Wasabi, with the dust threshold settings you can limit the value of coins shown in the GUI. When you set it to 0.0000 1000 bitcoin, and when you receive a coin worth 0.0000 0300 bitcoin, then this coin will not be shown in the coin list.

Where can I find the logs?

In the top left menu File > Open you can see there are several logs available. The Log File shows you the general information about Wasabi wallet. The Tor Log File shows the Tor specific logs.

How to activate Lurking Wife Mode?

You can activate Lurking Wife Mode from Settings or by clicking on your wallet balance. You can read more about Lurking Wife Mode here.

Coin Control Best Practices

Can I consolidate anonset coins?

It is advisable to limit the recombining of mixed coins because it can only decrease the privacy of said coins. This links all the consolidated UTXOs in one transaction, creating only one output, which then clearly controls all these funds. That said, if you combine less than 1 BTC it is less likely to reveal your pre-CoinJoin transaction history. The potential issue comes when you spend that coin. Depending on what you do with the coin you might reduce the privacy of the resulting change (if you send half your coin to an exchange for example, as they will know that you own the coin change). As a result it is best not to recombine ALL your mixed change, though you may wish to recombine some coins if you are planning on hodling for many years as this will reduce the fees required to spend the coins later.

If you would like to dive into the details of this topic, you can read more here and see more here:

How can I send my anonset coins to my hardware wallet?

Most hardware wallets communicate with servers to provide you with your balance. This reveals your public key to the server, which damages your privacy - the hardware company can now theoretically link together all your addresses. As a result it is not recommended that you send your mixed coins to an address associated with your hardware wallet unless you are confident that you have set up your hardware wallet in a way that it does not communicate with a 3rd party server (see below).

You can, however, manage your hardware wallet with the Wasabi interface. Alternatively, you can use your hardware wallet with Electrum, which connects to your Bitcoin Core full node through Electrum Personal Server.

What can I do with small change?

There are no hard and fast rules for what to do with the change. Generally try to avoid the change and use the Max button extensively to send whole coins. The most problematic type of change is what has anonymity set 1 [red shield] You should treat it as a kind of toxic waste [handled with great care].


You want to avoid merging anonymity set 1 coins with anonymity set > 1 coins wherever possible, because this will link your anonymity set > 1 coin to the coin you merge it with. Note that, this is also true if you merge them in a mix, however that is slightly less problematic, because some blockchain analysis techniques become computationally infeasible.

It is also important that you do not send different coins to the same receiving address (even if performed as separate transactions) as this will also link the coins together, damaging your privacy.

There are two different types of zero link change:

When you have a KYC coin with red anonset 1 and you register it for CoinJoin, then you get one anonset 100 green coin and one red anonset 1 change. This change is very clearly tied to your KYC input coin, but the CoinJoin output is pretty good with anonset 100. If you combine that red coin with the green, then it's clear that both of them belong to you, and thus the anonset of the output in this transaction becomes the lowest common denominator, in this case anonset 1.

When you take a 100 anonset coin, and you register it again for CoinJoin, then you get one coin with anonset 200, and one change with anonset 100. This change has anonset 100 because it can be linked to the input of the second CoinJoin, but this coin has anonset 100 already. So, although this change can still reveal pre-mix history, because the pr-mix history is another CoinJoin, you cannot go further back. So, it might be ok to send this second change output to some place, or even consolidate it, because it still has anonset.

When you consolidate several small change coins in a regular transaction, then every outside observer knows that they belong to the same cluster. However, you can consolidate within a CoinJoin by simply selecting all these coins in the CoinJoin tab. Because the Wasabi CoinJoin transaction shuffles inputs, for an outside observer it is not clear which inputs belong to the same Alice. However, the coordinator gets the input proof of ALL the coins that Alice has provided during the input registration phase. Thus the coordinator knows that this is a consolidation transaction. It is wise to assume that every one knows what the coordinator knows. So consolidating in a CoinJoin is better, but it might still reveal the common ownership of the coins.

Your Options

  • If you do not care about linking the history of the coins because they are all from the same source then you could combine them in a mix (queue all the change from the same source until you reach the minimum input required to mix, currently ~ 0.1 BTC).
  • Mix with Joinmarket.
  • Donate them (e.g. to the EFF)
  • Spend them on something that is not a particular privacy risk (eg. gift cards).
  • Open a lightning channel.
  • The ultimate solution is to 'close the loop' i.e. spend a change coin without merging it with other coins, do not generate it in the first place by sending whole coins.

Further Questions


How do I select coins for spending?

Unlike other Bitcoin wallets, the user cannot spend from Wasabi without selecting coins, since "Coin Control Is Must Learn If You Care About Your Privacy In Bitcoin", at least for today. The label field of the Send tab is also compulsory. The received coins will appear in your Send tab and you'll have to manually select which coins you'll want to spend from. By clicking on the Max button, one can spend all selected coins. Spending whole coins is beneficial to privacy.

How is the tansaction broadcasted?

Wasabi previously did not maintain its P2P connections over Tor. Since Wasabi is a non-listening node, broadcasting transactions through other P2P nodes over the clearnet would’ve let the peer to link your IP address to the transaction. This is why we were broadcasting our transactions to our backend server over Tor. Now, we started tunneling all our P2P traffic through Tor, too: We did it in a way that we only connect to onion nodes, so end to end encryption is now enforced between us and our peers. All this without involving any exit node. We connect to each peer through a different Tor stream. This enabled us to replace our transaction broadcasting mechanism. Now, we broadcast transactions to only one peer over Tor and immediately after that we disconnect the peer.

If Wasabi cannot broadcast a transaction through a random node over Tor, it will (in the last resort) send the transaction to the coordinator backend for broadcasting.

Once a transaction is sent, Wasabi will always open a new Tor circuit with a new random node on the network, in order to avoid giving away too much information to one party. When you send two consecutive transactions via Wasabi, you can be sure that they appear in two very different places on the network.

Wasabi will implement the Dandelion protocol for transaction broadcasting when the Bitcoin network adopts it.

  • What is the cluster history?


How much anonymity set do I need?

It is commonly said that an anonymity set of 50 is sufficient to evade blockchain forensics analysis. At least one round to re-mix your coins can increase your privacy drastically. With Wasabi this can be achieved in a matter of hours (or minutes if there are a lot of users).

  • How can I select UTXOs for CoinJoin?
  • How many rounds should I CoinJoin?
  • How does my wallet communicate with the Wasabi coordinator server?

Hardware Wallet

  • How can I type in the PIN of my Trezor One?
  • How can I manage the passphrase of my Trezor T?
  • Can I use the passphrase of my Trezor One?

Coin Control Best Practices

  • Which coins can I select for CoinJoins?
How can I mix large amounts?

Use Unequal Input Mixing and gain fungibility for UTXOs of 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.8, 1.6, 3.2, ... bitcoin! @youtube